We test for the stabilizing effects of political institutions on fiscal policies by examining the impact of two unlikely governors on their state's fiscal policies. Fiscal policies are joint products of executive and legislative decisions. These institutional factors tend to moderate the effect of changes in the chief executive, as does partisan competition for office. Jesse Ventura of Minnesota's and Arnold Schwarzenegger of California were unique-surprise-governors of their respective states. Although both governors were arguably less constrained by partisan loyalties than most others, the other institutional factors would still tend to limit their impact on public policy. Our evidence suggests that in spite of their unique path to office neither governor had a significant impact on their state's expenditures or deficits.
Introduction
The first generation of rational-choice models of policy formation implied that the individuals holding high offices have little effect on public policies. In the most straightforward electoral models, candidates converge to very similar platforms and are assumed to implement their promises after the election is won (Downs 1957, Coughlin and Nitzan 1981) . In the most straightforward interest group models, it is politically active groups rather than elected officials that matter. The persuasive campaigns of organized groups produce a stable vector of policies where the marginal influence of opposing groups equals one another (Tullock 1980 , Becker 1983 , and the balance of influence determines policy rather than the persons holding high office, who reflect those pressures rather than control them. Men and women who rise to influential positions in government are likely to be further constrained by promises and habits of thought that garnered support during previous stages in their careers. Insofar as median voter preferences over policies and the relative persuasiveness of interest groups are relatively stable, such models predict stable public policies that are largely beyond the influence of any single government official.
In the United States, the stabilizing effects of political competition are reinforced by the effects of divided governance. Presidents and governors have veto authority, but agenda control resides largely with multimember legislatures, where officeholders tend to have relatively long tenures because of advantages associated with incumbency. This division of authority as well as the internal organization of the legislature also tends to stabilize public policy Tullock 1962, Shepsle and Weingast 1981) . The senior staff of important government agencies also normally have long tenures in their agencies, and careerism together with bureaus' systems of formal and informal rewards tends to generate relatively stable bureau interests in policies and policy outcomes.
These, in turn, further induce policy stability through their discretion over the implementation of legislation (Niskanen 1971 , Congleton 1982 , Weingast and Moran 1983 .
Although elective office holders appear to have significant discretion over policy while in office, the first generation models imply that their policy choices are induced by a variety of institutionally generated incentives, promises made, and habits of thought and action developed prior to accession to high office. These classical models have been rebutted by what might be called second and third generation models of policy formation that imply officeholders have significant discretion over policies. There are, for example, analyses grounded in Arrow's (2012) impossibility theorem demonstrating that individual office holders can have major impacts on public policy if they have agenda control (McKelvey 1976) . Several recent papers suggest that electoral competition is not as binding on candidate choices as the first models assumed. The extent of convergence in candidate platforms is limited by differences in candidate valence or ability (Groseclose 2001) in even very competitive elections. Besley and Coate (1997) suggest that candidate positions do not shift during elections but reflect their own honest (and inflexible) assessments of ideal policies, rather than those of the median voter or pivotal interest groups. Moreover, even with full convergence in party platforms, differences in the competence of those elected to high office can affect policy outcomes insofar as better prepared candidates are able to more effectively implement the same platform Reynal-Querol 2011, Congleton and Zhang 2013) .
There are also interest group models in which an elected or appointed official's assessments of the relative persuasiveness of interest group efforts directly affects public policy (Pelzman 1976, Grossman and Helpman 1994) . If so, systematic changes in the types of individuals elected to high office or appointed to regulatory agencies will have effects on the policies and rules adopted. These effects will be systematic if the candidates elected or appointed to high office differ in their openness to particular lines of argument or are more or less beholding to interest group support. In these models, institutions bound the domain of policy choices, but sufficient discretion remains that the individuals holding high office have significant effects on the policies adopted and implemented. This paper attempts to shed light on the relative merits of the "institutionally induced equilibrium" and the "officeholders matter" hypotheses by exploring the extent to which two very unlikely state governors had effects on their states' fiscal policies. The two governors focused on are men whose paths to governorship were unconventional and so less likely to be constrained by past promises to interest groups, partisanship, or electoral pressures than candidates whose rise to office followed a more conventional path. Neither had significant careers in politics before winning high office.
Both men rose to high office through unorthodox, indeed unique, career paths and political circumstances. Jessie Ventura won as a third-party candidate with 36.9% of the vote against mainstream republican and democratic candidates. Arnold Schwarzenegger won a 2003 special recall election-the only one to do so in California history-in which there were many candidates.
Schwarzenegger's rivals noted his inexperience and lack of preparation for governance. He nonetheless won office with relatively strong support (48% of the votes). In neither case, could these governors be considered "groomed" for high office or known for their party loyalty, electoral experience, positions on public policy, or competence as policymakers. 1 If particular officeholders matter in the United States, it should be most evident in cases in which unusual men rise to high office through unconventional-indeed surprising-elections.
Models, Data, and Method
We use three models of government fiscal policies and four regression discontinuity estimation strategies to determine whether these two unusual governors had unusual effects on their state's fiscal policies. We focus on three relatively lean models of state expenditures. A pure inertial model characterizes state expenditures as a simple autoregressive process generated by stable patterns of interest group influence, forward looking voters, and stable economic and political institutions. 
In the median voter model, a gubernatorial effect would systematically change the government's response to pivotal voter demands, which again requires 2 ≠ 0 and/or 3 ≠ 0.
Our third model of policy formation augments the median voter model with institutional variables that reflect the division of legislative authority and possible partisan effects. In cases in which full convergence in candidate platforms fails to take place, differences among candidate platforms are at least partially caused by advantages that parties realize by maintaining a stable A and her public constraint is c(G) = tNY A where N is the adult state population, c(G) is the cost of public services, and t is the average tax rate. The tax rate will be a function of service level, population, average income. Maximizing utility generates a reduced form demand for government services of the form Gj* = γ(Yj A , Nj) for state j with population Nj, and will be approximately (Gj*/Nj) = g(Yj A ) for per capital government expenditures. Treating G as a vector of services would not change the variable(s) in the reduced form. 3 Such partisan effects are consistent with electoral competition models that include roles for political parties. In partisan models, parties create and maintain distinct policy agendas to retain their base of supporters (Duveger 1963 , Alesina 1988 , Grofman and Lijphart 2003 . In such cases, one would expect to observe partisan effects but not office-holder effects, insofar as parties select their candidates for high office.
that affect turnout, voter expectations, and the unobservable partisan dispositions of the persons running for office.
GovernorRepublican t takes the value 1 if the governor is a republican and 0 otherwise. If the party in control of the senate is the same as the party of the governor, then Senate t has the value 1. It is 0 otherwise. The House/Assembly t takes the value of 1 if the lower chamber is controlled by the same party as that of the state governor in year t, and it is 0 otherwise. A gubernatorial effect beyond that associated with party and divided governance would be indicated by a systematical change the government's response to pivotal voter demands, which again requires 2 ≠ 0 and/or 3 ≠ 0.
Data for the statistical analysis were collected from several sources. Median voter income is proxied with per capita real gross state products are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 4 We use of average rather than median income because of the relatively higher turnout of high Columns 1 and 4 report the inertial models for Minnesota and California, respectively. Columns 2 and 5 report the median voter model estimates, and Columns 3 and 6 report the institution-augmented median voter model estimates. All three models account for most of the variation in per capita expenditures in the two states. Only one of the six estimates supports the "governor matters"
hypothesis. The median voter model for California exhibits governor specific effects that are significant at the 10% level. The other five estimates imply that there are no discontinuities in per capita state expenditures or in the responsiveness of government that can be attributed to the presence of an outsider governor, which is consistent with a strong form of the institutionally induced equilibrium hypothesis. Significance Measures: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Regional Panel Estimates of Fiscal Policies
State level estimates of the factors that contribute to public policy may be deemed superior to other cross sectional or pooled approaches because every state's political system includes unique features that affect trends and the sensitivity of policy choices to changes in political factors.
However, a state by state approach limits the sample size, which can generate higher standard errors than feasible with other estimation strategies. It is possible that outsider governor effects exist, but that the small samples used in our single state estimates generate relatively large standard errors for the coefficient estimates and so reduce prospects for finding statistically significant effects. To explore this possibility, we assembled regional panels for California and Minnesota, consisting of one of those states and their four surrounding states. The states in these regional panels have similar histories, ethnicities, weather, and geography and thus are likely to have more or less similar political cultures.
The adjacent first ring states for Minnesota are Wisconsin, Iowa, South Dakota, and North Dakota. The adjacent first ring states for California are Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.
Within the upper midwestern panel, Jesse Ventura was the only independent candidate elected to the governorship. Within the western panel, Arnold Schwarzenegger was the only governor elected through a recall election. Thus, both governors may be regarded as unique for their respective panels. The tables reported below and in the appendix provides evidence that these panels are distinct from one another in that there are statistically significant differences in income elasticities and other parameter estimates across the two regions. (See Table 9 of the appendix.)
The panel estimation strategy is similar to that used for the single state estimates, but includes state fixed effects (Si) and year fixed effects (Tt). The state fixed effects account for stable unmodeled differences among states and the year fixed effects account for common random macroeconomic and macropolitical shocks that might affect political deliberations within a state in a given year. The fixed-effects inertial model for the Minnesota and California panels is:
with Si being the state fixed effect and Tt being a year fixed effect. The fixed effects median voter model is:
The fixed-effects median voter model with institutions is: We also find evidence of significant partisan and institutional effects in the California panel.
western states with Republican governors having systematically lower expenditures than those with democratic governors in the period of interest. Partisan and institutional effects are also implied by the significance of binary variables for state senate or house controlled by the same party as the governor. (The signs of those variables are, however, unrelated to the purposes of this study.) All three models account for most of the variation in state expenditures within their respective panels. 
Panel Estimates of Difference in Difference using Synthetic Controls
We next explore whether the evidence found in the single state and panel estimates is robust to other estimation strategies. We next apply two difference in difference approaches, using different implementations of the synthetic control methodology (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2015) . In the first series of estimates we use panel averages as a synthetic controlwhich is to say, we create a hypothetical average panel state that can be used as the panel norm, or as a control to isolate the treatment effect generated by an unusual governor. We estimate differences between state i's expenditures in year t and the panel average for that year. We focus on the institution-augmented median voter model. An outsider governor effect will generate larger deviations from the panel norm than can be accounted for by income, partisanship, and institutional effects. We use differences between the average real per capita state gross product in the panel and actual state per capita gross product as the income explanatory variable. We again focus on the institution-augmented median voter model. Differences between each state's actual and its predicted per capita expenditures and per capita deficits are used as the relevant dependent variables. In effect, the differences are now state-level residuals with respect to their synthetic control. We use a similar difference between the synthetic control's state per capita income and actual income in the state of interest as the income variable. The estimates look for unexplained effects on the residuals associated with the tenures of the two outsider governors relative to that which would have occurred without them, as in conventional time-series applications of the synthetic control methodology. Outsider-governor effects on fiscal outcomes in their respective states should be highlighted by this approach. This estimation strategy is applied to the upper Mid-Western and Western Panels and to the states of California and Minnesota alone. Table 7 reports the results for each panel and the two states of interest. The synthetic controls for each panel account for most of the predicable path of real per capita state expenditures and deficits; and thus, the explanatory power of the models fall significantly. We find second-order effects for changes for average income shocks on real state per capita expenditures, but not deficits, which suggests that state expenditures are normally adjusted to account for past tax revenue shocks (possibly generated by unexpected changes in average income in the previous year). We also find second-order effects from same party assemblies with respect to expenditures in the upper midWest, but not in the Western panel. There is, however, no evidence of a systematic effect of outsider governors on real per capita expenditures or deficits. Significance Measures: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Conclusions
Most of the statistical evidence developed in this paper supports the institutionally induced equilibria hypothesis. We find little evidence that unusual persons who rise to governorships through unorthodox career paths have unusual effects on state budgets or borrowing. If we assume that the results reflect a likelihood function across models and estimates, we can conclude the institutionally induced equilibria hypothesis is more likely to be correct than the governors matter hypothesis, at least for the states and time period explored. This is not to say that unusual governors had no unusual effects on the policies directly controlled by the governor, which are beyond the scope of this study, but it is to say that these unusual men did not have a unique impact on their state's overall fiscal policies, at least not ones that can be discerned through statistical methods. We do, however, find evidence that that the party affiliation of office holders matter. We also find significant partisan and institutional effects, as found in many other studies.
Of secondary importance for the purposes of this paper, but perhaps of greater importance for the literature on state and local finance as a whole, is that the parameter estimates differed significantly across states and panels. For example, we found significant partisan effects on deficits in the upper Midwest, but partisan effects on both expenditures and deficits for states near the West Coast. In both the panel and state estimates, the estimated effects of income on state expenditures differed by more than 2 standard deviation. Together these results suggest that the effects of partisan organizations, political institutions, and political culture differ significantly across regions.
This in turn suggests that the use of pooled national data sets for these sorts of studies is likely to generate biased parameter estimates. Fixed state and time effects evidently do not adequately adjust for differences in governmental responsiveness to income and party, nor fully account for differences in political culture.
The support provided by this study for the institutionally-induced-equilibria hypothesis is limited to the institutional setting explored. State governments in the United States tend to have more fiscal discretion than most other sub-national governments, but are subject to more procedural constraints than confronted in many national governments. The effects of individuals holding their nation's or region's most powerful office is, for example, likely to be far greater in dictatorships and also in parliamentary systems in which a prime minister or chancellor can unilaterally make broad policy decisions that directly affect government expenditures, taxes, and deficits. However, for the United States, our results suggest that men and women with unique paths to high office are unlikely to have effects on policy that differ significantly from those of more conventional members of their political parties. Significance Measures: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance Measures: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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